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Executive Summary 
1) Background 
 Rice farming is a very important agricultural policy issue for the Korean government not 
only because rice is a staple food for the Korean population but because rice production is also 
an important source of income for those involved in rice farming. The importance of rice 
production to the agricultural sector of Korea is indicated by the fact that 49% of Korea’s 
agricultural land is devoted to rice production. Therefore, Korean agricultural policy has focused 
on rice production issues as well as the income of farmers involved in rice production.   
To support rice farming income, the Korean government has been implementing a direct 
payment program for rice paddies which gives subsidies to rice farmers since 2003. However, it 
is unclear whether rice farming income has increased since this program started because the 
amount of the payment is calculated not by income level but by the price of rice and given to the 
land owners whether they actually farm the paddies or not.  
2) Analysis 
To discover whether rice farming income has increased since the direct payment program 
was implemented, a comparison of rice farming income data between 1993-2002 and 2003-2012 
was undertaken. Data show that rice farming income has not increased since the direct payment 
program was implemented. In fact, rice farming household income has decreased by 10.3% from 
2003 to 2012 after increasing by 34.2% from 1993 to 2002. Considering that agricultural income 
as a whole increased by 15.5% and average national household income increased by 52.9% from 
2003 to 2012, rice farming income has been in decline.  
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The reason why rice farming income has not increased can be explained by some 
conditions during that period. Direct payments are calculated based on the gap between the target 
price and the realized price. The target price of rice has been fixed since 2003 even though other 
economic factors such as GDP per capita, average income per household and CPI(Consumer 
Price Index) have significantly increased. In addition, rice consumption per capita in Korea went 
down from 83.2kg in 2003 to 69.8kg in 2012. Furthermore, rice farming area per household 
declined from 22,146m
2
 in 2003 to 20,030m
2
 in 2012, and the number of individuals per rice 
farming household also declined from 2.96 in 2003 to 2.55 in 2012.  
3) Recommendations 
Considering that GDP per capita in Korea increased by 60% during the period, it is 
necessary to adjust the target price for direct payment calculation to some degree. Because the 
subsidy is determined by the gap between the target price and the realized price, adjusting the 
target price will increase amount of payment to rice farmers and it can make rice farming income 
also increase.  
Furthermore, it should be noted that the rice production subsidy has to be given to the 
real farmers who actually grow the rice crops. And for the income support to be appropriate, the 
calculation of direct payment has to take into account the income level of rice farming 
households.   
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1. Introduction 
Rice is the staple food of Korea and one of the country’s most important agricultural 
commodities. Rice farming in Korea started around 2,000 B.C. and since that time Koreans have 
used rice as a staple food, often eating it with every meal.
1
 For thousands of years, most of 
Korean agriculture was rice farming. Recently various kinds of agricultural products have 
become more prevalent, including horticulture products, green house farming and other special 
crops which are more profitable. Nevertheless, rice paddies make up 49% of the total agricultural 
area of Korea and rice is the most important source of nutrition. As a result, policy related to rice 
production has become one of the most crucial issues in Korea.   
To maintain the rice industry, the Korean government has implemented several programs 
such as increasing yield, irrigation, seed improvement and import quota. Furthermore, given that 
rice farming could not be maintained without farmers, the Korean government has also 
established rice production subsidies to help stabilize or increase the income of rice farmers to 
keep them in the business of rice farming.  
Traditionally, income support for the agricultural sector has been implemented by price 
support from the Public Stocking in Korea. With the Public Stocking scheme, government 
bought overproduced rice from farmers, then put it on the market in order to lower the rice price 
when the price is too high. Sometimes the Korean government used the stocked rice for aid to the 
North Korea or other countries which suffered the shortage of food. But since 2003, the main 
instrument of the agricultural income support policy especially for the rice paddies has been 
                                           
1 Ho-Chul Lee, “Study of the Agricultural Economics”, Kyungbook University. Korea. 1989. 
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changed from Public Stocking to Direct Payment
2
. It was assumed that direct payment would be 
helpful to maintain farmer’s income, but a critical question is whether rice farmers really have 
had sufficient income since this program has been implemented.  
For example, the amount of money that would be provided to farmers has been 
calculated by the price of rice rather than whether any farmer’s income was high enough or not. 
In addition, the funds were provided to the landowner. A farmer who rents land for rice farming 
could not get direct payment, but the landowner who does not carry on farming could.  
In light of this, it is necessary to examine whether this program really increases income 
level for farming households, which was presumably one of the goals of the rice production 
subsidy programs
3
. 
Previous studies about government support for agriculture including income policies and 
their effectiveness will be discussed first. Then, the status of agriculture in South Korea and the 
direct payment program for rice paddies will be discussed. Data on direct payment will be 
examined to show whether rice farming income has increased since the program was introduced. 
To do this, a comparison of rice farming households’ income before and after the program will be 
used. Then, the reasons why rice farming income has changed will be discussed.  
  
                                           
2http://www.mafra.go.kr/list.jsp?board_kind=&board_skin_id=&depth=3&division=H&group_id=4&link
_menu_id=&link_target_yn=N&link_url=&menu_id=1233&menu_introduction=&menu_name=&parent
_code=67&popup_yn=N&reference=4&tab_yn=N&code=left&tab_kind=Y&locationId=4 
3 Ministry of Agriculture, Food and Rural Affairs, “Manual of Agricultural Programs”. Seoul. 2013. 
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2. Previous Studies 
 Government Support for the Agricultural Sector 
There are many criticisms that government support for the agricultural sector, including 
the direct payment program, is not effective in achieving governmental goals. These views are 
mostly based on economics. For example, Bates
4
 mentioned that government provision and 
subsidization have led to inefficiencies and corruption, especially for the inputs such as credit, 
extension service, irrigation, seed and fertilizer. He also mentioned that these supports would put 
unbearable burdens on the government’s financial situation and advised that these input supports 
should be privatized. Furthermore he insisted that subsidies for the agricultural sector should be 
eliminated or rapidly reduced.  
In July 2012, the United States Government Accountability Office (GAO)
 
published 
findings that the U.S. Department of Agriculture (USDA) made more than $46 billion in direct 
payments to farmers from 2003 to 2011 and recommended that direct payments should be 
eliminated or reduced because they created several problems. First, GAO pointed out that much 
of the direct payments were paid to farmers who did not grow the right agricultural products. 
Farmers who did not grow the right crop received about $10.6 billion. In addition, 0.15% (2,300) 
of farmers who received direct payments reported that their lands were fallow. Further, when the 
direct payments to farmers were first authorized, they were expected to be transitional, but 
subsequent legislation passed in 2002 and 2008 has continued the program, which is no longer 
relevant.
5
  
                                           
4 Bates R, “Markets and states in tropical Africa”. University of California Press. Berkeley, CA. 1981. 
5 United States Government Accountability Office, “Farm programs – Direct payment should be 
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Another problem with the program is targeting; direct payments are concentrated among 
the larger farmers based on farm size and income. In 2011, 73% of total direct payments were 
given to the top 25% of recipients. Moreover, with the current government deficit and debt level, 
the U.S. government may not be able to afford direct payments.
6
 The GAO report also pointed 
out that this program may lack effectiveness. Even though direct payments are less distortive 
than other programs such as price support, economic distortions can still occur from these 
payments. For example, farmers whose farms are not viable by themselves and should shut down 
can survive with these payments. This means that marginal farmers who should move to other 
jobs are artificially kept in the agricultural business through the subsidies creating economic 
distortions.
7
 
On the other hand, some believe that the agricultural sector should not be approached 
with an economics view insisting that market failures in the field of agriculture require 
government involvement to solve those problems. Some researchers consider issues of income 
redistribution or food security as part of this view. 
For example, Chang
8
 pointed out that the concept of government failure is used by 
economists who insist that government support has to be eliminated or reduced, but that can be 
applied when markets are working perfectly. However, there have been several market failures in 
the agricultural sector. He mentioned that market signals can lead agricultural actors to use inputs 
                                                                                                                                        
reconsidered”. GAO-12-640. 2010.07: 13-14 
6 Ibid: 16-17 
7 Ibid: 18-19 
8 Ha-Joon Chang, “Rethinking public policy in agriculture: lessons from history, distant and recent”. 
Journal of Peasant Studies 36:3. United Kingdom. 2009.12: 477-515 
 
8 
at a less than socially optimal amount. There can be several public goods other than just 
agricultural productions such as beautiful scenery and rural amenities in the agricultural field, 
and these public goods would be produced at a less than socially optimal level without 
government’ intervention. So, agriculture should be supported by government to make up these 
problems. 
Sometimes certain government actions may make distortions in the short term but 
actually increase long-term productivity. Chang mentioned agricultural tariffs as an example. 
Tariffs can lead to short-term inefficiencies, but when the tariff revenues are invested by the 
government in the agricultural field, it might promote agricultural growth and overall economic 
growth in the long run. Furthermore, he suggested that it may be better to create distortions even 
when there has been no market failure. For example, if a country has a well-designed welfare 
system such as pension or free medical service, low income people could be supported by that 
welfare system. But, without that, government should implement policies to improve income 
stability. 
 
 Income Support Policies for the Agricultural Sector 
Park
9
 offered examples of agricultural income policies in the US, Japan and the EU. 
According to him, net farm income per year in the US has increased consistently, reaching 
$77,000 per farming household in 2010. Direct payment from government budget made up 
approximately 15.5% of this income. Park found that this increase was caused by the Farm 
                                           
9 Joon-Kee Park, “A study in long-term policy direction in agricultural investment”. KREI 2011-17. 
Seoul Korea. 2011.06 
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Security and Rural Investment Act of 2002, which expanded the policy of direct payment given 
in fixed amounts of cash unrelated to the real amount of farming output. Furthermore, Counter-
Cyclical Payment (CCP) was adopted to make up for the sudden collapse of global grain prices.
10
  
Park said that the EU has a more scaled-up farming structure than Korea or Japan, and 
regional specialization is the key strength of the EU’s agriculture. For example, horticulture is a 
specialty in Spain, Italy and Greece, the dairy industry in Finland and Ireland, and hog farming 
in Denmark, Belgium and the Netherlands. The EU operates the Common Agricultural Policy 
(CAP) and adopted a single direct payment system called the Single Farm Payment Scheme (SPS) 
in 2003. Under the SPS system, farmers get payment regardless of their crops. This means that 
direct payment does not affect decisions about which crops farmers will grow. This program does 
not create inefficiency and farmers can get enough money. In 2009, the total budget for 
agriculture in EU was €56 billion, of which 70% (€39 billion) was used for direct payments.
11
  
Park also mentioned the agricultural status and policies of Japan. As in Korea, the staple 
food of Japan is rice, so there has been an emphasis on the rice industry. The budget for the 
agriculture department in Japan decreased from 3,423 billion yen in 1995 to 2,271 billion yen in 
2011, with direct payments to farming households making up 40.4% of the total agricultural 
budget. Since 2010, a compensation system for farming household income has been 
implemented. Under this system, the difference between target crop prices and realized prices is 
paid to farming households through a payment comprising a fixed payment and a variable 
payment.
12
 
                                           
10 Ibid: 69-70, 79 
11 Ibid: 114-115, 119-120, 126-132 
12 Ibid: 51-53, 62 
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 Effectiveness of Income Support Policies 
There are many criticisms that farming income has not been increased although a large 
amount of government support has been provided to farmers and rural areas. Yu
13
 found that the 
effects of agricultural financial expenditure on rural residents’ income are relatively unstable in 
the short term, but have a steady and weak positive effect in the long term. When rural residents’ 
income reaches a certain level due to the government support, a self-promotion mechanism can 
be set in order to promote the continued increase in rural residents’ income.  
Park
14
 mentioned that agriculture in South Korea has proceeded in the direction of 
specialization and scaling, but the size of agriculture is still relatively small. And, the decrease of 
farming income and the increase of income disparity have intensified recently. As a result, the 
population in rural areas is being diminished and the settlement condition such as residential and 
cultural environment is going steadily downhill, so population and culture of rural areas are 
disappearing.  
The Korean Ministry for Food, Agriculture, Forestry and Fisheries (MIFAFF)
15
 reported 
in 2012 that current income stabilization policies such as the direct payment program for rice 
paddy have some problems. For example, the direct payment program leans too much toward 
rice farming, and the payments cannot overcome the negative effects from globalization efforts 
such as the South Korea – United States Free Trade Agreement which went into effect in March 
                                           
13 Zhi-wei Yu, “Co-intergration analysis of urban resident income, agricultural financial expenditure 
and farmers’ income”. Asian Agricultural Research 11-12. Guangzhou China. 2009.01: 8-12 
14 Joon-Kee Park, “A study in long-term policy direction in agricultural investment”. KREI 2011-17. 
Seoul Korea. 2011.06: 12-20 
15 Mifaff, “The improvement plan of farming income stabilization system”. Seoul Korea. 2012. 
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2012. MIFAFF suggested policy goals to remedy the situation. First, the Korean government has 
to develop various positive values of agriculture and rural areas such as beautiful views and 
amenities of rural areas. Second, the current direct payment program should focus on small scale 
and elder farmers to a greater degree and set up a control system that can prevent overlapping 
support. Third, every policy must be feasible in terms of the ability of the government to pay and 
acceptability to farmers or rural residents. Finally, the program should suit international norms 
such as considering the limitations from World Trade Organization (WTO) and Aggregate 
Measurement of Support (AMS).
16
 
In 2008, Lee and Yang
17
 analyzed the effects of direct payment under specific scenarios. 
They found that when the market price of rice decreased by 30%, income from rice production 
decreased by 82%. However due to the income stabilizing effect of direct payment, the real 
income of rice farming households was only reduced 11%, while the burden of the government 
increased by 202%. If the government reduced the target price by 5%, the amount of variable 
payments would be reduced by 54% and the income of farming households would be decreased 
by 6%. With this analysis, the positive effect of direct payment was explained. 
 
  
                                           
16 Ibid: 2-3 
17 Choon-soo Lee and Seung-ryong Yang, “The effects of rice income direct payment program by 
scenario”. Research of Agricultural Economy 49-3. 2008.9 
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3. Basic Information 
South Korea and its agricultural status 
South Korea has an area of 24,641,349 acres and a population of 48,955,203 as of July 
2013. In 2012, Korea’s Gross Domestic Product (GDP) was 1,163.5 billion US dollars,
18
 the 15
th
 
largest among all countries. GDP per capita in 2012 was $23,679.
19
 
<Figure 1: Location of South Korea> 
 
<Table 1: South Korea and Ratio of Agriculture> 
 Population Area (acre) GDP ($) GDP per capita ($) 
Total 48,955,203 24,641,349 1,163.5billion 23,679 
Agriculture 2,911,540 4,274,897 39,285million 13,493 
Percentage 6% 17% 3% 57% 
*Source: The Korean government (Statistics Korea) 
As shown in Table 1, the GDP of the agricultural sector of Korea in 2012 was $39 billion 
($13,493 per capita). The agricultural population in 2012 was 2,911,540, and the number of 
                                           
18 $1=1,100 Korean Won 
19 Statistics Korea (www.kosis.com). 
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farming households was 1,151,116. Agricultural land was 4,274,897 acres, of which rice paddy 
comprised 2,098,350 acres (49%), beans including soy beans 230,480 acres (5%), root and tuber 
crops such as potato 115,166 acres (3%), chili pepper 112,332 acres (3%). 
<Table 2: Budget of the Korean Government in 2013> 
 
*Source: Ministry of Strategy and Finance in Korea 
As shown in Table 2, the total budget of the Korean government was $311 billion in 
2013. The budget allocated for agriculture and fisheries was $16.7 billion or 5.4% of the total 
budget, with the budget for the agricultural sector only at $12.3 billion.  
<Table 3: Budget for the Agricultural Sector
20
> 
   2012  2013
Total 12,434 12,297 
Strengthen agriculture constitution
21
 2,501 2,788 
Farming income and management stability 1,792 1,901 
Rural development and welfare 1,446 1,499 
Management and distribution of product 2,939 3,181 
S.O.C. in agricultural sector
22
 2,702 1,899 
Food industry 609 667 
Extra working expenses 132 41 
Administrative costs 314 320 
*Source: Ministry of Agriculture, Food and Rural Affairs (MAFRA) of Korea 
                                           
20 Unit: million U.S. dollars 
21 R&D, facility modernization, energy issues, marketing, education and so on. 
22 Irrigation, reserve, bank and so on. 
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As shown in Table 3, the biggest part of the agricultural sector budget - $3.2 billion - is 
spent for the management and distribution of agricultural products, with strengthening 
agriculture at $2.8 billion, and farming income and management stability at $1.9 billion. 
<Table 4: Budget by Commodity
23
> 
  2012 2013 
Total 12,434 12,297 
Rice 5,010 4,409 
Horticulture 1,742 2,171 
Livestock 1,106 1,264 
Food 609 667 
Not specified 3,966 3,786 
*Source: Ministry of Agriculture, Food and Rural Affairs (MAFRA) of Korea 
As shown in Table 4, budget in the agricultural sector can be divided by commodity: 
$4.4 billion was spent for the rice industry, $2.2 billion for horticulture and $1.3 billion for 
livestock. 
 
 Direct Payment for the rice paddy 
Since the Uruguay Round (UR) and World Trade Organization (WTO) agreement came 
into effect, Korea’s markets have been opening up gradually, such as through the South Korea - 
United States Free Trade Agreement that went into effect in March 2012. As Korea’s markets are 
becoming more open, its agricultural sector has been damaged. For example, the food and grain 
                                           
23 Unit: million U.S. dollars 
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self-support rate
24
 have decreased every year as shown in Figure 2.  
 
 
<Figure 2: Food and grain self-support rate> 
 
Opening the market pushed the government to implement policies which were purposed 
to support the agricultural sector, including income support. Before the start of the World Trade 
Organization (WTO) system, most countries controlled the price of agricultural products to 
protect their own agricultural industry. The Korean government had implemented a Public 
Stocking Scheme, which is a purchase and release mechanism based on market price.
25
  
However, after the WTO agreements became effective, the Korean government has been 
unable to implement policies that could affect the price directly.
26 
As a result, a new type of 
policy - direct payment to farmers - has been used in many countries such as the US, the EU and 
Korea. The staple food of Koreans is rice, so the Korean government has been implementing the 
                                           
24 Percentage of food and grain consumption which is produced in domestic market. 
25 OECD. “Evaluation of Agricultural Policy Reforms in Korea”. 2008. 
26 Taeho Lee. “The direction of direct payment policy in the medium and long term”. KREI Forum. 
2013.02. 
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direct payment program for rice paddies since 2003. This direct payment is composed of two 
parts. The first is the fixed payment which is a fixed amount of money paid to rice farmers, and 
the second is the variable payment calculated by comparison between the target crop price and 
the realized price, which is the sum of market price and amount of fixed payment per household.  
The fixed amount is given to the owner of the rice paddy, with the total amount 
determined by the size of the paddy. The variable payment is determined by the price of rice. 
Every year, there is a target price of rice. If the realized price is lower than the target price, a 
variable payment would be made. In the beginning of the year, the fixed payment is given to land 
owners, and the variable payment is given after the market price of rice is decided.
27
 
 
<Table 5: Direct payments for the rice paddy> 
Year 2003 2004 2005 2006 2007 2008 2009 2010 2011 2012 
Budget 
(million 
U.S. dollars) 
Total 433 438 1,368 1,049 901 647 1,115 1,248 561 555 
Fixed 433 438 549 652 647 647 575 566 561 555 
variable - - 819 397 254 0 540 682 0 0 
Average rice price  
Per 80kg (U.S. dollars) 
145 148 147 127 134 137 148 129 126 151 
**Source: Ministry of Agriculture, Food and Rural Affairs (MAFRA) of Korea 
                                           
27 MAFRA, “Implementing Guide for the agricultural programs”. Seoul Korea. 2012. 
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 Table 5 shows the amount of direct payment given to rice farmers every year. In 2008, 
2011 and 2012, the variable payment was not given because the realized price was higher than 
the target price.  
 
19 
4. Income of Rice Farming Household: Rise or Not? 
To examine the change of income since the direct payment program was adopted in 2003, 
a comparison is made of the rice farming income data 10 years before (1993-2002) and 10 years 
after (2003-2012). Using Microsoft Excel, two trend lines were drawn to help compare the two 
periods. Each year’s average income of rice farming household data from 1993 to 2012 has been 
used
28
.  
<Figure 4: Trends lines before and after program
29
> 
 
Figure 4 shows the two trend lines from 1993 to 2002 and from 2003 to 2012. From 
2003 to 2012 the trend line has declined (income declined by 10.3% from 21,868 thousand won 
to 19,609 thousand won), while the trend line before that period increased (income increased by 
34.2% from 15,074 thousand Korean won to 20,225 thousand won). This comparison shows that 
                                           
28 Data sources: Korean Statistical Information Service (KOSIS, http://kosis.kr) and Ministry of 
Agriculture, Food and Rural Affairs (MAFRA) of Korea 
29 Unit: Thousand Korean Won 
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the direct payment program did not have a positive effect on the income of rice farming 
households.  
To determine the effectiveness of the direct payment program more accurately, two more 
comparisons were implemented. Average rice farming income was compared with the income of 
all farming households, and with the average national income was compared with rice farming 
income.
30
 
<Figure 6: Income from Rice Farming Compared To Income from All Agricultural Activities
31
> 
 
Figure 6 shows the trend lines of rice farming income and whole agricultural income. 
From 2003 to 2012, the average income for agricultural households as a whole increased from 
26,878 thousand Korean won to 31,031 thousand won, for a rate of increase of 15.5%. The trend 
line shows this increase. The figure also shows that rice farming income declined from 2003 to 
2012.  
                                           
30 Data of total agricultural income and whole national income source: KOSIS 
31 Unit: Thousand Korean Won 
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<Table 6: Ratio between rice farming income and all agricultural income
32
> 
year 1993 1995 1997 1999 2001 2003 2005 2007 2009 2011 2012 
rice 
farming 
15,074  17,702  21,046  18,635  20,857  21,868  22,648  24,143  21,824  19,707  19,609  
whole  
agriculture 
16,928  21,803  23,488  22,323  23,907  26,878  30,503  31,967  30,814  30,148  31,031  
ratio 89.0% 81.2% 89.6% 83.5% 87.2% 81.4% 74.2% 75.5% 70.8% 65.4% 63.2% 
 
Table 6 shows the ratio between rice farming income and all agricultural income. In 
1993, the ratio was 89.0% and decreased slightly to 81.4% in 2003. After 2003, the ratio declined 
more sharply, reaching 63.2% in 2012. This means that rice farming income has declined while 
income from other agricultural commodities has increased.  
<Figure 7: Income from Rice Farming Compared with National Household Income
33
> 
 
Figure 7 shows that the national average household income has increased greatly, from 
                                           
32 Unit: Thousand Korean Won 
33 Unit: Thousand Korean Won 
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35,280 thousand Korean won in 2003 to 53,950 thousand won in 2012 (52.9%), while income of 
rice farming households has declined from 21,868 thousand won in 2003 to 19,609 thousand 
won in 2012 (-10.3%).  
<Table 7: Ratio between rice farming income and national household income
34
> 
year 1993 1995 1997 1999 2001 2003 2005 2007 2009 2011 2012 
rice 
farming 
15,074  17,702  21,046  18,635  20,857  21,868  22,648  24,143  21,824  19,707  19,609  
national 
average 
17,734  22,933  27,448  26,697  31,501  35,280  39,010  44,105  46,452  50,811  53,950  
Ratio 85.0% 77.2% 76.7% 69.8% 66.2% 62.0% 58.1% 54.7% 47.0% 38.8% 36.3% 
 
Table 7 shows how much rice farming income has declined compared with the national 
average income. In 1993, the ratio between rice farming income and national average income 
was 85.0%, but it decreased to 62.0% in 2003 and then to 36.3% in 2012. 
From the analysis above, a conclusion can be drawn: compared to the period before the 
policy was implemented, the income level of rice farming households has not increased since the 
direct payment program started. In fact, rice farming income has decreased relative to total 
agricultural income and whole national income.  
 
  
                                           
34 Unit: Thousand Korean Won 
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5. Discussion  
It seems that the direct payment program which was intended to support rice farming 
income has not had a sufficient effect. There seems to be two main reasons why the income of 
rice farming households has not increased though the direct payment program was implemented: 
the direct payment program has internal problems, and the circumstances of the rice industry 
were not able to support income at a sufficient level.  
The direct payment program has several internal limitations to support sufficient income. 
One is that the amount of payment is calculated not by income level but by the rice paddy area. 
This means that small-scale farmers who have a small size of rice paddy could not get sufficient 
money, while a small number of large-scale farmers get a large amount of money.  
In addition, the calculus utilizes the price of rice rather than income. Compensation for 
the lack between the target price and the realized price can have a positive effect on income level, 
but the target price has never been changed from 170,083 Korean Won per 80kg
35
 since the 
program was first implemented. During that period, national average household income 
increased by 52.9%, and GDP per capita increased by 60% from 16,040 thousand won in 2003 to 
25,590 thousand won in 2012.
36
 The fixed target price could be one of the main reasons that rice 
farming income did not increase in spite of the direct payment. 
It seems that there are also several environmental factors that had negative effects on 
rice farming income during the period of direct payment.   
<Table 8: Rice Demand in Korea> 
                                           
35 Source: MAFRA of Korea 
36 Economic Statistics System (ECOS) of the Bank of Korea (http://ecos.bok.or.kr) 
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year 2003 2004 2005 2006 2007 2008 2009 2010 2011 2012 
Rice consumed 
per capita (kg) 
83.2 82.0 80.7 78.8 76.9 75.8 74.0 72.8 71.2 69.8 
Population 
(1,000) 
47,859 48,039 48,138 48,372 48,598 48,949 49,182 49,410 49,779 50,004 
Total consumption 
(million kg) 
3,982 3,939 3,885 3,812 3,737 3,710 3,639 3,597 3,544 3,490 
*Source: MAFRA of Korea 
Table 8 shows the rice consumed per capita and total national rice consumption 
calculated by multiplying per capita rice consumption and total national population. Rice 
consumption per capita has dropped dramatically in Korea from 83.2kg in 2003 to 69.8kg in 
2012. Although the population gradually increased each year, total consumption of rice declined 
from 3,982 million kg in 2003 to 3,490 million kg in 2012.     
<Table 9: Rice Farming Area per Household> 
year 2003 2004 2005 2006 2007 2008 2009 2010 2011 2012 
Farming area  
per household(m
2
) 
22,146 21,233 21,399 22,363 23,467 18,881 19,114 20,856 18,788 20,030 
*Source: MAFRA of Korea 
Furthermore, rice farming area per household has been slightly reduced as shown in 
Table 9, which means rice farming households could not scale-up, but remained small farmers. 
<Table 10: Number of Members per Rice Farming Household> 
year 2003 2004 2005 2006 2007 2008 2009 2010 2011 2012 
Number of  
members 
2.96 2.85 2.83 2.77 2.77 2.67 2.62 2.61 2.56 2.55 
*Source: MAFRA of Korea 
Table 10 shows that the number of individuals per rice farming household has also 
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declined, which means that the number of family members who can earn money through farming 
is lower and farming households do not have the same earning power as before. And, it also 
means that rice farming households don’t need as much income as before.    
These reasons may have contributed to the circumstances that made rice farming income 
fails to increase during the direct payment program period. If the direct payment had not been 
given to farmers, their income might have dropped even more. 
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6. Policy Recommendations 
Data and analysis show that the income level of rice farming households has not been 
sufficiently supported under the current direct payment program. Considering the importance of 
the rice industry in Korea, it seems that the Korean Government has to change its policy 
directions. Recommendations have to be focused on fixing the program’s inherent problems 
because environmental factors cannot easily be changed.  
First, the target price has to be increased. From 2003 to 2012, the CPI (Consumer Price 
Index) has gradually increased every year (Table 11). The CPI is determined by monthly data on 
changes in the prices paid by urban consumers for a representative basket of goods and services
37
. 
Target price should be adjusted to at least the increasing rate of CPI. 
<Table 11: increasing rate of CPI> 
year 2003 2004 2005 2006 2007 2008 2009 2010 2011 2012 
Increase rate 
of CPI (%) 
3.5 3.6 2.8 2.2 2.5 4.7 2.8 3.0 4.0 2.2 
*Source: E-Index of Statistics Korea (http://www.index.go.kr/potal) 
Second, the payment should be given to the farmers rather than the land owners. The 
purpose of this program is to support rice farming households and maintain the rice industry. 
Supporting farmers themselves will enable them to keep farming rather than moving to other 
industries.  
Third, the calculation of direct payment has to consider income level rather than rice 
paddy area. With this change, small farmers who need more support for their income can have 
sufficient earnings to continue rice farming. 
                                           
37 U.S. Bureau of Labor Statistics (http://www.bls.gov/cpi/). 
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